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Abstract
The systematic differences of gender representation across occupa-
tions, gender-based occupational segregation, has been suggested as one
of the most important determinants of the still existing gender wage gap.
Despite some signs of a decreasing trend, there is evidence that occupa-
tional gendered segregation is persistent even though gender differences
in human capital variables have been disappearing. Using an agent-based
model we provide a framework that introduces discriminatory behavior
based on labour market theories of discrimination where workers and firms
can exhibit gendered preferences. The introduction of discriminatory be-
havior transforms the otherwise random dynamics of occupational choice




Gender-based occupational segregation - the asymmetrical gender distribution
of occupations - has been suggested as one of the most important determinants
of the gender wage gap (Gauchat, Kelly, and Wallace, 2012; Blau and Kahn,
2017; Blau and Kahn, 2007; Hegewisch and Hartmann, 2014).
Blau, Brummund, and Liu (2013) assessed gender-based segregation trends
over the 1970-2009 period for the U.S. and found that this type of segregation was
decreasing but at an increasingly slower rate. Based on the O. D. Duncan and B.
Duncan (1955) index of occupational dissimilarity they found that between 1970
and the 1980s, when segregation decreased more significantly, the reduction was
mainly due to a movement of women into male dominated occupations, while the
reverse did not happen. At the same time, this movement was further reinforced
by the significant increase of female participation in the labour market from 1970
to 2009.
These factors led to a large decline of the share of men in over-represented
male occupations, but without of a corresponding and equivalent change of the
share of women in over-represented female occupations. Additionally, the de-
cline of male-employment in occupations over-represented by men occurred in
simultaneous with an increase of the share of men in moderately male occupa-
tions. This situation is what the authors refer to as a ’tipping’ pattern where
men flee previously male-dominated occupations when these occupations become
feminized to a certain tipping threshold (for a more detailed assessment of this
pattern seePan, 2015). This phenomenon relates to the still small cultural and
institutional changes in the devaluation of traditionally women activities that
provide incentives for women to enter male dominated jobs while not providing
enough for men to enter jobs dominated by women (England, 2010).
In more recent work, Blau and Kahn (2017), for the period between 1980-
2010 in the U.S., find that the conventional human capital variables, such as
experience and education, explain little of the gender wage gap while gender
differences in occupation and industry remain important. They claim that dif-
ferences in gender roles and the gender division of labor are relevant to explain
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these differences. Moreover, this trend is not only seen in the U.S.. In the Eu-
ropean Union, the Duncan index of occupational dissimilarity, measuring the
proportion of male workers that would have to change occupations in order to
end gender-based segregation, stayed at around 50% both in 2011 and 2015
(OECD, 2017).
Therefore, despite some signs of a decreasing trend, there is evidence that
points to persistence of gender-based occupational segregation even though gen-
der differences in human capital variables, such as educational attainment, have
been disappearing (De Hauw, Grow, and Van Bavel, 2017; OECD, 2020).
This is consistent with a patriarchal labour market, i.e. not only do indi-
viduals prefer working in gender appropriate occupations but they also actively
want occupations to stay gendered. In fact as stated in Hartmann (1976), it is
the patriarchal structure of the labour market that creates gender-based occu-
pational segregation, usually leaving women in lower paying occupations which
encourages women to marry and perform domestic work. Not surprisingly, male
workers played a crucial role in maintaining the occupational gender division.
Walby (1986) narrates how patriarchy interacted with the labour market:
first by legally excluding women from the labour market and specific trades,
then by force of the male-dominant unions and afterwards by inducing gender-
based occupational segregation. An example in Walby (1986) is that of clerk
work where she argues that to accommodate both the wants of employers, that
wanted cheap labour, and male workers, that were afraid to be replaced, employ-
ers used job segregation by assigning women to new occupational sub-groups.
Consequently, men do not have to directly compete with women while employers
could still benefit from cheap labour for similar work. This can be described as
an important effect of patriarchy since neither of the two forces driving segrega-
tion are influenced by women.
In addition, as regards to firms, there are also incentives for perpetuating
gender-based occupational segregation related to the reproduction of labour
power. Moreover, as women usually perform non-paid domestic work, which
has a specific purpose in replenishing labour power of herself and her family
as current and prospective workers. Therefore, it is important that women are
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kept in domestic-related paid jobs and also in part-time jobs that can accom-
modate their second shift. Hartmann (1976) also argues that, as regards to
employees, segmentation of the labour market plays an important role since it
exacerbates existing divisions among workers which weakens their bargaining
power for better working conditions.
At the individual level, agents can also display gender-based discriminatory
practices or preferences that are reproduced from both sides of the labour mar-
ket, i.e. from the supply and demand sides.
On the supply side, workers can be active participants in creating a segre-
gated market. As mentioned, there is some evidence that workers have gender-
based preferences when choosing (or fleeing) an occupation. More specifically,
Pan (2015) documents a tipping pattern where men flee an occupation when this
becomes excessively feminized, which is consistent with the predictions from a
Schelling model (Schelling, 1971)1. The findings by Pan (2015), that occupa-
tions tip in regions where men hold more sexist attitudes toward the appropriate
role of women indicates that gender roles (and so a in-group gender preference),
are important to explain persistence in gender-based occupational segregation.
At the same time, England (2010) argues that men lose money and suffer cul-
tural disapproval if they choose to enter female-dominated occupations which
translates into an incentive to perpetuate gender stereotypes.
Additionally, Cejka and Eagly (1999) look into the importance of gender
stereotypes of occupations in further reinforcing gender-based occupational seg-
regation. They find that common gender stereotypes are good predictors of
the gender distribution among occupations: occupations over represented by
women require feminine qualities while occupations over represented by men
require male qualities. This prediction of the gender distribution among occu-
pations made on the basis of gender stereotypes points to a supply-driven factor
for the persistence of gender-based segregation.
On the demand side, theories on individual-led discrimination practices point
1The Schelling model, based on the dynamics of two groups of individuals that have a
preference in being neighbours of individuals of their own group, shows that even a small
amount of in-group preference can form segregated societies.
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to two main sources: taste-based or statistical discrimination. Taste-based dis-
crimination (Becker, 2010) happens when an employer has prejudice against
a specific gender, for example women, and the disutility in employing women
appears as a cost resulting in lower salary offers to women.
Statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977) occurs when
the employer, which is not able to assess the true productivity of the worker, uses
the statistical information he has on the group the worker belongs to (for example
gender) to estimate the workers’ productivity. This last type of discrimination
can lead to occupational segregation as employers of already over-represented
occupations will have better information on the over-represented gender and
therefore can show a preference for it.
This paper applies an agent-based model to represent an artificial labour
market. In so doing, we are able to model preferences at both the individual
and institutional levels and, simultaneously, represent the interplay between the
demand and supply sides of that market.
Such an agent-based approach allows for considering gender-based prefer-
ences and discriminatory behaviour and, therefore, to isolate the dominant ef-
fects that lead to the persistent of gender-based occupational segregation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes
the agent-based model, while in Section 3, the characteristics of the simulation
scenarios and corresponding results are presented. The last section concludes.
2 The model
The model employed in this work is based on Araújo and Weisbuch (2008). This
abstract model is easily adapted to any particular field. Agents are described
by bit-strings that represent positions. Each agent belongs to one out of two
categories: individual workers or firms. In such a labour market, positions are
offered by firms while workers look for positions. Workers and firms are then
described by a set of k binary characteristics standing for job requirements as,
for instance: working conditions, required qualifications, social advantages and
any specific individual (or institutional) preference.
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Because those preferences are easily coded by bits, agent-based modelling is
particularly suited to explicitly display, rather than implicitly, discriminatory
behaviour of labour markets. And since bits can flipped along the model dy-
namics, preferences can change depending on the value of some global variables
as, for instance, segregation.
Being parameters calibrated from experimental data, our approach can be
used to assess if current levels of gender-based occupational segregation arise
from differences regarding labour market determinants or if they are reliant on
gender-based preferences and discriminatory behaviour.
2.1 Agents characteristics and requirements
At the start, there are N1 + N2 agents in the model: N1 workers and the N2
firms.
Each worker i is defined by a set of characteristics (or job requirements)
regarding potential positions offered by firms. Each worker is coded by a string
of ten bits (k = 10) representing, for instance: ethnicity, salary level, specific
skills, years of training or experience. We let eight of these characteristics to
be abstractly represented and randomly set. To the other two bits we assign
concrete attributes: i) gender, and ii) preference for an occupation oj over-
represented by a specific gender.
Similarly, firm j has an equivalent set of ten characteristics, being two of
them concretely defined: the preference for: i) a specific gender, and ii) a
position over-represented by a specific gender. The remaining 8 bits stand for
any characteristics or requirements as preference for an ethnicity, offered salary
level, expected skills, required years of training or experience, etc.
Bit coding of over-representation of occupations by a specific gender shall fol-
low real life examples. According to Hegewisch and Hartmann (2014), women in
the U.S. were the majority of the share of dental assistants between 1972-2012,
while they were persistently under-represented as civil engineers, although it in-
creased to close to 15% until 2012. Therefore, the binary option for occupations
in our model can be thought as either dental assistant or civil engineer, which
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initially are over-represented by women or men, respectively.
However, over-representation can change depending on the model dynamics.
That means that gendered occupations can flip and become over-represented
by the opposite gender. However, empirical evidence has showed that real life
dynamics result in persistent gender segregation.
By explicitly considering a gender-based preference of both workers and
firms, it is possible to account for both gender-stereotypical choices by work-
ers regarding occupation and statistical discrimination, by firms.
Such an explicit coding of core versus adjustable features were included in
this version of the model by keeping some bits fixed and fuzzying a few others.
However, we believe that the qualitative dynamical features of the model would
not be very much affected by this change.
2.2 Matching
Usually, bit-string models have a recognition/matching process, where the prin-
ciple of similarity plays the fundamental role.
The matching is done at each time step, where workers look for the firms
closest to their requirements, as in Araújo and Weisbuch (2008). For worker i
the overlap of their characteristics with the requirements of firm j, qi,j equals∑10
n=1Bi,l = Bj,l where l represents the bit (l = 1, ..., 10) and ”=” stands for
the logical equivalence relation. At each time step, each worker chooses the
most similar firm, being the least amount of required similarity given by a theta
threshold: qi,j > θ.
2.3 Payoffs
Payoff functions account for matching outcomes in the form of happiness for
the worker and capital for the firms. The payoffs increase with the relative
overlap between workers’ requirements and the matched firm (qi,j) and decrease
with effort employed in working (cw for workers and cf for firms).
Happiness is updated with the last period happiness plus the overlap of the
worker with the chosen (most similar) firm. This function, for each worker i in
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t, is therefore represented as:
Hi,t = Hi,t−1 + qi,j,t − cw (1)
If happiness falls below zero the worker exits the market being replaced by a
new one with the same gender and occupation preference (either dental assistant
or civil engineer). This is to guarantee that the gender distribution stays the
same throughout the exercises and so, the equilibrium result only depends on
the dynamics of discrimination. In addition, to define one occupation as strictly
over-represented by men and another by women we need to have 50% of the
individuals belonging to each gender.
The capital of each firm is updated with its previous value plus the over-
lap between all workers that have the highest matching with that firm minus a
constant cost (cf) of running business. The general expression of capital accu-
mulation is described as:
Cj,t = Cj,t−1 +
∑
i(j)
qi,j,t − cf (2)
The index j(i) runs over all the workers j that are supplied by the i firm.
When capital of a firm falls below zero the position ends, being not renewed,
and the firm relocates to other labour market.
Of course, in each particular application the terms in these equations should
be normalized by appropriately chosen units in order to represent commensu-
rable or dimensionless quantities.
At the initial time all workers and firms are assigned a fixed value H = H0
and C = C0. Then, at each time step desired positions and offered positions are
compared. The firm that supplies each worker is chosen at random among those
with the larger matching.
In all our simulations, we have chosen the initial number of workers N1 =
1000 and firms N2 = 30, (the bit-string length) k = 10, initial endowments
H0 = 5 and C0 = 200 and the constant costs cw = 1 and cf = 4.5. Workers
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match with positions if the overlap is at least of 50% (θ = 0.5).
In the next subsections, the model is tested in several different scenar-
ios, which are characterized by different combinations of the parameter values,
namely:
1. Baseline: in this scenario, the initial conditions are set as above described,
without any gender-driven preferences or discriminatory practices.
2. Gender-driven occupation choice by workers and firms: here, we intro-
duced the gender-driven preference for a specific occupation by the worker,
and also the preference for a specific gender, by the firm depending on the
gender-representation of the occupation.
3. Tipping pattern: in this last scenario, the baseline conditions are set with
a disutility cost for male workers. Their happiness is decreased by a
certain amount when the position they choose belongs to an occupation
over-represented by women. Therefore; the happiness function of male
workers i in t is given by:






, if the worker is a man
0, otherwise
(4)
where gi is the gender bit of the worker and oi defines if his matched
position is over-represented by women or men. If there is a correspondence
between the gender of the male worker and the gender over-representation
of the occupation then the cost is null, otherwise it is positive, leading to
a negative impact on happiness.
This means that dwi,t is high when men are in occupations over-represented
by women and decrease when they move to an occupation over-represented
by men. For example, initially, dental assistant is considered as the job
over-represented by women and so, when a male worker is matched with a
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dental assistant position he would gain happiness according to the overlap
of his characteristics with the position but they would feel less happy than
if they were in a male-dominated job, in this case as a civil engineer. In
addition, this disutility variable can also be seen as a measure of seg-
regation trends in male dominated occupations. The higher it is the less
segregated they are while a decrease of the variable means that male work-
ers are increasingly matching with male-dominated occupations which, all
things constant, means an increase in segregation.
We use the Ducan Index as defined in reference O. D. Duncan and B. Duncan










where wo represents women that are in occupation o and mo represents men
in occupation o. This gives the percentage of men that must change occupations
(to a women dominated one) in order to achieve full integration. For example if
the index has a value of 0.5 then 50% of male workers need to change from a male
dominated occupation to a female dominated one in order to avoid segregation.
The value of the index is zero when there is perfect gender integration and
one when the labour market is perfectly segregated by gender, meaning each
occupation is only performed by workers of the same gender.
3 Simulation results
All simulation times were 1000 and therefore the results presented in the next
figures show average values obtained from such a large number of runs. They
show the time evolution of happiness and capital as well as the same evolution
of the disutility parameter dwi,t (Eq.4) and the index of segregation ist (Eq.5).
Over the simulation results we will consider that workers can only get a dental
assistant job or a civil engineering job which are, initially, jobs that belong to
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occupations over-represented by women or men, respectively. The objective of
naming the over-represented occupations is to better exemplify how the model
can be used, and not strictly to say that these jobs can not change gender
representation throughout the simulations.
3.1 Baseline scenario
In the baseline scenario, where there are no discriminatory preferences for a
gender or for any gender-driven appropriate work, simulations show a low level
of segregation as the lower right plot in Figure 1 shows.
Most of firms survive and their business is profitable from a very early stage.
Workers average happiness stays under 4, since the cost of living (cw) is always
grater or equal one. Therefore, workers do not increase their happiness by
continuing to work, which means the average happiness increases just whit some
workers renewal (and their corresponding renewed endowment).
Regarding the disutility measure (dwi,t) - aimed at incorporating a cost for
men in being in an occupation over-represented by women (e.g. dental assistant)
- it is not included in the payoffs of this first scenario. As such, and since no
gender-driven preference or discriminatory practice were considered here, this
variable mimics the segregation index, being almost constant along the all time
steps.
3.2 Gender-driven occupation choice
When we introduce a dependence between gender and the preference for an
occupation (for workers) and between the preference for a worker from a gender
group and the type of occupation (for firms), the results in Figure 2 show that
simulations properly replicate the empirical results of persistent gender-based
occupational segregation.
The gender-occupation dependence is set in the initial conditions by ensuring
that at least 50% of women would prefer to apply for a position that is in an
occupation over-represented by women; this idea is replicated for male workers.
At the same time we also consider that at least 50% of positions that belong
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Figure 1: Baseline scenario
to an occupation over-represented by a gender (for example by men) want to
employ the over-represented gender.
In our model, where workers can only get a dental assistant job or a civil
engineer one, at least 50% of women prefers, initially, a dental assistant job
while the same percentage of men prefer the civil engineer occupation. As the
simulation exercise develops, these occupations can change gender representation
and, if so, the preference of each worker accompanies it i.e. if the dental assistant
occupation becomes over-represented by men then men will prefer it over civil
engineering. However, if gender-based occupational segregation is persistent this
does not happen.
The results are displayed in Figure 2 where happiness and capital behave
as in the baseline but the segregation index and the disutility measure show
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great changes. Moreover, the last plot in Figure 2 shows that the segregation
index displays a much higher value even in the very first time steps showing a
stabilization trend after some firms leave the market.
Regarding the disutility measure and since it is not included in the pay-
off functions of this scenario, its behavior keeps replicating the segregation in-
dex. The higher gender-based occupational segregation exhibited in this scenario
comes from the fact that men are lead to occupations that are over-represented
by men.
Figure 2: Gender-driven occupation choice
Therefore, we conclude that introducing a bit dependence that replicates
individual gender-driven preferences, arising either from statistical discrimina-
tion or gender stereotypes, is enough to induce the persistence of gender-based
occupational segregation similar to the one that empirical evidence provides.
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3.3 The ’tipping’ pattern
In this scenario, men have a disutility in being in an occupation that is over-
represented by women. Regarding segregation, results in Figure 3 are quite
similar to those obtained from the gender-driven occupation choice.
Figure 3: The ’tipping’ pattern
The time evolution of dwi,t shows that values are constantly decreasing.
Simultaneously, segregation shows a slightly increase, meaning that men are
increasingly concentrating in occupations over-represented by men. This can be
seen as a situation where men that were in an occupation over-represented by
women, in a dental assistant job, started to incorporate it as a disutility in their
choice making and instead pursued a civil engineering job.
It shall be noticed that while in the last scenario segregation was induced
by gender preferences from the supply and demand sides of the labour market,
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here is the ’tipping’ pattern that leads to the gender-driven segregation that has
been empirically observed. Accordingly, shows a faster decline when compared
with the gender-driven occupation choice.
By introducing the disutility measure in mens’ payoffs, we are able to repli-
cate the effects of the ’tipping’ pattern in sustaining gender-based occupational
segregation. This means that even if women and firms don’t display gender pref-
erences, the behaviour of male workers, by fleeing occupations over-represented
by women, are enough to lead to a persistent gender-based occupational segre-
gation.
4 Conclusions
An important mark of agent-based models is their ability to include arbitrary
levels of heterogeneity and uncertainty into the description of a system of in-
teracting agents. Moreover, computer simulations are often suited for making
important dynamical trends of these models noteworthy.
Using an agent-based model we provide a framework that introduces dis-
criminatory behavior in the labour dynamics of matching workers to positions.
The discriminatory behavior is based on labour market theories where workers
and positions exhibit gendered preferences based on socialization, statistical dis-
crimination, and the ’tipping’ pattern exhibited by men that flee occupations
when they become more feminized.
The introduction of discriminatory behavior transforms the otherwise ran-
dom dynamics of occupational choice into a persistent gender-based occupational
segregation which is consistent with empirical evidence. The calibration of the
characteristics and requirements of workers and positions from empirical data
provides a measure of segregation that is solely due to discriminatory behavior.
Being aware of such an outcome is essential for policy design.
Further enhancement of the model shall take into account the incentives
women have for entering male-dominated occupations as well as changes in gen-
der preferences at the employer level that can occur by interacting with employ-
ers of the non-preferred gender and, by these means, diminishing the power of
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statistical discrimination.
Likewise the bit-string length that can be set to represent a larger (or smaller)
number of individual characteristics, so does the our binary basis. One step to a
more realistic agent description may be achieved by allowing the agents (workers
and firms) to make n–ary choices. In so doing, any individual independent
characteristics as gender, salary level and skills can be chosen from a larger set
of options. Future work shall consider this possibility as the essential features
of the model would remain unchanged.
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